| Joseph Francis Shea’s Looseleaf Notebook | |
|---|---|
|
Origin |
Joseph Francis Shea |
|
Type |
Looseleaf Notebook |
|
Effects |
Fills with issues and details of any organization’s operations |
|
Downsides |
Stress induced breakdowns |
|
Activation |
Leadership Position? |
|
Section |
|
| [Source] | |
Origin[]
Joseph Francis Shea (September 5, 1925 – February 14, 1999) was an American aerospace engineer and NASA manager. Born in the New York City borough of the Bronx, he was educated at the University of Michigan, receiving a Ph.D. in Engineering Mechanics in 1955. After working for Bell Labs on the radio inertial guidance system of the Titan I intercontinental ballistic missile, he was hired by NASA in 1961. As Deputy Director of NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, and later as head of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, Shea played a key role in shaping the course of the Apollo program, helping to lead NASA to the decision in favor of lunar orbit rendezvous and supporting "all up" testing of the Saturn V rocket. While sometimes causing controversy within the agency, Shea was remembered by his former colleague George Mueller as "one of the greatest systems engineers of our time". In addition to Shea's technical abilities, it quickly became obvious that he was also an excellent manager of people.
It was Shea's responsibility to bring engineering discipline to North American Aviation and to NASA's management of its contractors. In the coming years, any change to the design of the Apollo spacecraft would have to receive its final approval from Shea himself. He kept control of the program using a management tool that he devised for himself—a looseleaf notebook, more than a hundred pages in length, that would be put together for him every week summarizing all of the important developments that had taken place and decisions that needed to be made. Presented with the notebook on Thursday evenings, Shea would study and annotate it over the weekend and return to work with new questions, instructions, and decisions. This idiosyncratic tool allowed him to keep tabs on a complex and ever-expanding program.
Deeply involved in the investigation of the 1967 Apollo 1 fire, Shea suffered from stress. Problems with the Apollo command module continued through the testing phase. The review meeting for the first spacecraft intended for a manned mission took place on August 19, 1966. One issue of concern was the amount of Velcro in the cabin, a potential fire hazard in the pure-oxygen atmosphere of the spacecraft, if there were to be a spark. Although the spacecraft passed its review, the crew finished the meeting by presenting Shea with a picture of the three of them seated around a model of the capsule, heads bowed in prayer. The inscription was simple: "It isn't that we don't trust you, Joe, but this time we've decided to go over your head". Whatever the precise distribution of responsibility, Shea remained haunted by the feeling that he, personally, was responsible for the deaths of three astronauts. For years after the fire, he displayed the portrait given to him by the Apollo 1 crew in the front hallway of his own home.
Effects[]
Each individual page will fill with copious amounts of notes, figures and calculations showing the current happenings in an organization. Itinerary includes difficulties currently being resolved and future issues which need more guidance. The more one uses it, the more capable they are at parsing quickly through large amounts of information to glean the important sections for focus.
Continuing to use will cause a compounding of raw facts to exacerbate any existing anxiety surrounding work. Issues that result in loss of livelihood or stability of their peers is a great fear upon them. Suffering a nervous breakdown and requiring sedatives to cope is a serious risk always at play.